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Abstract. Physical access control systems play a central role in the
protection of critical infrastructures, where both the provision of timely
access and preserving the security of sensitive areas are paramount. In
this paper we discuss the shortcomings of existing approaches to the
administration of physical access control in complex environments. At the
heart of the problem is the current dependency on human administrators
to reason about the implications of the provision or the revocation of sta
access to an area within these facilities. We demonstrate how utilising
Building Information Models (BIMs) and the capabilities they provide,
including 3D representation of a facility and path-nding, may reduce
the incidents of errors made by security administrators.
1 Introduction
Physical access control is a key element in securing critical infrastructure such
as airports, ports, transportation hubs, energy generation plants and military
infrastructures [9]. A typical large-scale infrastructure can span across multiple
sites with several multi-storey buildings that can host multiple zones with unique
security characteristics. Further, there can be several dierent pathways connect-
ing zones. Of particular interest to physical access control is the fact that there
can be normal pathways such as corridors, stairways, and lifts or there can be
indirect pathways such as ceiling spaces, partition walls, and ventilation ducts.
The scale of the facilities and the spatial relationships and connectivity between
the controlled spaces makes the manual administration of access particularly
dicult for security administrators [4]. Specically, it is hard to comprehend
the three dimensional nature of the environment through two-dimensional oor
plans, which are commonly used by administrators for physical access control
conguration and management.
It is not only the scale of these physical facilities that complicates the admin-
istration of access control, but the changing culture of these organisations. It is
no longer the norm to have all employees at a facility work for the same organisa-
tion [21]. Many individual systems and organisational functions are outsourced
to external contractors and employees attached to these partner organisations
also share the same spaces and resources. This is a dynamic process where the
people that require access can change frequently. For example, the heating, ven-
tilation, air conditioning and power management systems can be independently
contracted by dierent operators, whose sta may need access to various, some-
times highly secure zones in a facility.
There are several shortcomings in the current approaches to physical access
control administration tools. The heart of the problem is that they place con-
siderable decision making responsibility on the security administrators. For the
purpose of this paper, we conceptually divide administrative requirements that
could be facilitated to improve existing physical administrative tools into three
categories.
The rst requirement is the assignment and revocation of the access to phys-
ical spaces. Currently the administrators commonly use two-dimensional oor
plans as visual aids to know the spaces, doors, and resources that they need to
give access to users. These maps can be digital and part of some of the commer-
cial Physical Access Control Systems (PACS) or simply printed. It is dicult to
comprehend the three-dimensional nature of the buildings with multiple oors
connected through lifts, stairs and other access paths through two dimensional
maps. This is further complicated with the adoption of exible design practices
in many organisations where oor plans change frequently [26]. This can aect
the access control process and requires retraining of local knowledge by adminis-
trators. The manual process of assignment and revocation of ne-grained access
rights in complex environments is therefore challenging in practice. The process
of access control administration could be improved with the emergence of 3D
modelling tools that can be utilised to improve the user experience of access
control tools.
The second key requirement for security operators of critical infrastructures
is to comply with least privilege requirements by determining the minimal set
of physical resources that sta need in order to perform their tasks. The iden-
tication of the minimal set of access permissions demands an analysis of the
implications of assignment (or revocation) of permissions to physical resources,
e.g., doors, hallways, emergency exits. For example, it is important for security
administrators to determine if a user is given access to a resource, what other
resources can they access, directly or indirectly? In the case of physical access,
if a user is given access to a door, what rooms and spaces can they reach di-
rectly through hallways, and indirectly by crawling through air-condition ducts
or ceiling spaces?
The third administrative requirement is the ability to monitor and audit of
sta access to physical resources. Security audits are becoming particularly im-
portant due to regulatory compliance requirements. Access control audits can
include various data mining operations on past access records or current access
control rules. Audit requirements may be post event or more real-time monitor-
ing to eciently determine who is currently in an aected area under emergency
situations. This can help prioritise rst responders to plan and evacuate build-
ings more eectively.
In recent years, there has been signicant interest from industry and the
research community into the usability of security technologies [2, 6, 14]. However,
published research into the usability of physical access control administration
tools is limited. The human factors aecting physical access control and how the
functionalities of administration tools hinder or facilitate the process of security
policy creation has been overlooked while the need for eective physical access
control has increased [4].
In this paper we introduce a novel tool that utilises Building Information
Models (BIM) to facilitate the security administration of physical resources. The
use of BIMs has gained increasing acceptance around architecture, engineering,
and construction industries during the past years [3]. BIMs provide a shared
repository of three-dimensional structured data of physical objects, spatial re-
lationships, and dynamic processes within a building. The process of building
information modelling begins from the design phase of the building and evolves
throughout the lifecycle of the building potentially capturing a vast amount
of static and operational information associated with the building. The use of
BIMs in an authorisation tool can make the process more intuitive with three-
dimensional visualisation of buildings and enables spatial relationship analysis
to be part of the access control process.
2 Motivating Scenario
In this section, we present an example scenario that will be used to illustrate the
research problems in the later sections. We consider how an administrator would
provide physical access in an airport environment, controlled and operated by
multiple stakeholders. An airport employee can belong to any of the partner
organisations that operate within the airport. However, their access to shared
spaces and systems must be controlled under a single access policy.
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Fig. 1. A two-dimensional oor plan that is typically used to congure physical access
control rules
Let us assume there is an emergency repair required in the baggage han-
dling area of the airport, marked by X in Figure 1. In most airports, there will
be pre-approved technicians from a contracted company to perform this task.
Ideally, they should be given access only to the space of interest within a lim-
ited timeframe and the access rights revoked at the completion of the assigned
task. However, in practice these access conditions are not ne grained, enabling
most employees to access spaces they need to access even when they are not
on duty. The technicians are pre-authorised to access all the areas they need
to access to perform their jobs. For example, a lift repair technician will have
access to all areas where there are lifts. Furthermore, most of the current ac-
cess control administration tools rely on 2D maps of the facility to determine
the spaces and resources to give access. As shown in the gure, there can be
multiple entry points for a facility such as A, B or C (via lift or stairs). For
each of these there can be multiple paths passing through dierent doors that
lead to the desired location X. The security administrators must determine the
most appropriate path when they are giving access. For a larger facility, the
complexity increases with more entry points and path options, and it can be-
come very hard to comprehend with the aid of 2D maps. 2D maps are poor in
representing 3D environments with multiple oors connected by stairs, lifts, and
ventilation ducts [19]. Furthermore, spatial zones can be dynamic objects in a
facility based on the operational conditions. For example, the same set of spaces
may be assigned dierent security levels based on the threat level or in response
to an emergency evacuation scenario.
The desirable process for this access control assignment should start from the
request to perform a job not as an assignment to individual resources or doors
in a physical access control system. The authorisation system should be able to
compute the list of resources that should be accessible based on operational needs
and the facility's overarching physical security policy. For example, a system
policy could say that unaccompanied maintenance contractors should only be
given access to doors that have a monitoring CCTV camera xed. It is also
desirable to have pre-dened access patterns for particular resources that comply
with system policies. For example, it is possible to pre-dene an access path for
cleaners to access a particular space within the facility, which can be applied to
all users of that class.
3 Related Work
Human-computer interaction is often seen as the weakest link of security in many
systems [23]. In practice, many security practitioners consider access control as
a task that they perform irregularly and many of them do not have the neces-
sary training [6]. The major motivation behind the current access control tools
and systems has been regulatory requirements for accountability and preventive
measures [5]. Even widely researched and adopted access control concepts such
as Role Based Access Control (RBAC) are in practice hard to grasp for many
non-specialist users who are most of the time the end users of these administra-
tion tools [7]. It has been widely argued [6, 7] that access control systems and
associated administration tools must consider usability as a basic requirement
at their design time. In recent years, research into human computer interaction
in security, also known as HCI-SEC [14], has gained much attention. The main
motivation behind HCI-SEC is that security and usability must complement
each other [2]. It is widely accepted that human errors can be prevented or min-
imised with changes to the user-interfaces to a system [20]. A better approach to
handling human error is to address them at a system level, rather than blaming
them on individuals [24]. In general, resource owners are the people with the best
knowledge about their access control requirements [11]. However, it is often di-
cult for these resource owners to express their security needs in computer terms
correctly. A formal approach for analysing the correctness of physical access con-
trol rules is presented by Fitzgerald et al. [10]In access control, administrators
are expected to express the functional goals as user roles or permissions. It is
desirable to express these rules in an intuitive way [16]. This has been the main
motivation behind the work being discussed in this paper.
User interfaces that interact with three-dimensional object displays can ben-
et users of an access control administration tool, which needs to convey the
details of the building with multiple dimensions to its users. Such interfaces
with three-dimensional displays are suitable for systems that need to identify
information with depth [30]. There have been attempts in commercial software
products for using building models in policy administration tools for physical se-
curity. Some of the recent versions of industry standard physical access control
systems provide support for importing CAD les of building and using them
as visual interfaces for administration. Our analysis into current commercial
tools and associated research show that the available user interfaces are not
adequate in addressing these usability requirements behind policy authoring.
The SiPass solution from Siemens supports 2D maps that can be imported as
AutoCAD les [27]. Gallagher Command Centre (i.e. formally known as Car-
dax FT Command Interface) includes a comparable visual interface feature with
oor maps [13]. The Omnipresence 3D Security Platform [12] provides inter-
face connecting to other systems, including access control systems. However, the
functionalities provided by these applications are limited to 2D maps and an-
notation of spaces. They do not use the spatial information present in building
information models to infer spatial relationships which can be used in access
control policy creation and management.
Building Information Models (BIM) can be seen as centralised repositories
of objects and processes within a building. BIMs are designed from the initial
design process of the building, and they evolve throughout the lifecycle of the
building. The overall goal of building information modelling is to provide a com-
mon repository of semantically rich three-dimensional information that can be
used seamlessly and sequentially by all members of the design and construc-
tion team, and ultimately by the owner/operator of a facility throughout the
facility's life cycle [18]. BIM technology extends into fully integrated 3D and
4D modelling adding the time dimension for scheduling or sequencing for the
building design. This process produces the building information model, which
incorporates spatial relationships, geographic information, building geometry,
and quantities and properties of building components, including the life-cycle
processes of construction and facility operation. The use of building informa-
tion modelling in this context has gained increasing acceptance around dierent
industries during the past years [29]. Even though other types of data models
such as CityGML [15] exist that can be used for buildings, the wider architec-
ture, engineering, construction (AEC) research community, private sector, and
governments have adopted building information modelling as the way forward
for buildings [3]. BIMs support computational geometry that enables spatial
analysis functionalities such as path nding. There are tools to formally analyse
BIMs in the Industry Foundation Classes (IFC) format for integrity, quality and
physical safety [8], thus ensuring desirable outcomes for spatial analysis func-
tions. BIMs are used in emergency response, evacuation, and recovery scenarios
to support indoor navigation with path nding capabilities and to provide im-
portant building information with spatial context to emergency responders and
rescuers [25]. Some of these existing functionalities also have security and access
control implications. For example, in the event of an emergency evacuation se-
curity privileges and physical access policies can change based on the aected
areas. This requires an authorisation framework that can support creating pre-
meditated access policy.
4 Using BIMs for Access Administration
In this section, we present an access control administration tool that we have
developed as part of our research into utilising BIMs for access management in
large scale facilities. This prototype implementation addresses the three main
physical access control administration problems we have identied earlier: intu-
itively creating physical access control policies, conveniently managing physical
access control systems, and eectively auditing physical access control logs.
The core of this administration tool is based on the concepts of our authori-
sation framework using building information model that we previously presented
in [28]. The authorisation framework utilises BIMs in three key stages of access
control: policy design, policy management and decision making. As shown in
Figure 2 each of these processes are captured by a unique component in the
authorisation framework. We provide a brief overview of this framework in the
following paragraph.
The BIM layer consists of BIMs that are loaded into a model server. These
BIM les originate from multiple stakeholders of the facility that are converged
into one BIM in the model server. The spatial reasoning module provides the spa-
tial reasoning functions required for the authorisation framework. This includes
dierent spatial functions such as locating access doors to a space, reachability
analysis based a specied starting and ending points, or obtaining the list of
resources contained within a given space. The visualisation engine will generate
3D and 2D representations of BIM data to be used by dierent processes of
the authorisation framework such as spatial reasoning and policy transforma-
tion. The authorisation layer of this framework adopts the formalised XACML
architecture [22]. It adds spatial capabilities through the extension points sup-
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Fig. 2. Architecture of an authorisation framework using building information models
ported by the XACML standard. The access layer of this framework provides
access control decision-making capabilities to external systems via the Access
Control Interface. It also enables external systems that have their own autho-
risation decision-making capabilities to utilise the framework functionalities via
the Access Information Interface.
The authorisation model is designed to support a converged approach to-
wards physical and logical access control. In this paper we will only focus on our
proposed tool for administering physical access control. The BIM layer provides
the base for the implementation by providing the spatial data model for repre-
senting resources and computing spatial functions. We have also implemented
the visualisation, spatial reasoning, and policy transformation components as
part of this prototype. These components can be interfaced to an external phys-
ical access control system through the access information interface; however it
is not part of the current version of the tool.
This prototype is developed as a client-server application that can be ac-
cessed through any modern web browser that supports OpenGL. The authori-
sation framework is modelled into an Eclipse Modelling Framework, in conjunc-
tion with a BIM engine that is based on the same technology. The meta-model
shown in Figure 3 is the foundation for our prototype implementation. We take
an approach similar to [17], by combining attribute and role based access con-
trol. The user model represents the generic role based policy specication. It is
connected to the more descriptive policy model through the assignment class.
Resources are objects contained in the building information model. A specic
instance of an object can be accessed via its globally unique identier (GUID).
In this implementation, we are only using the object types of Zones, Spaces,
and Doors. Conditions include any relationships or constraints, including time
or binary exclusions. For example, binary exclusion would allow a user access
to only one of the two specied spaces to satisfy separation of duty constraints.
We use the XACML data model [22] at policy level. The meta-model policies
are transformed and mapped into the basic XACML policy elements such as
subject, resource, action, and condition.
The main user interface for the prototype loads within a browser window with
multiple tab panels (see Figure 4). The search and results panels are shared to
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Fig. 3. Simplied meta-model diagram for the implementaion of the physical access
control administration tool
enable a consistent experience across dierent modes of operation. The visual-
isation panel loads BIM objects and other conditions are superimposed on the
same rendered model. This also has the option to switch between 2D and 3D
representations of the visualisation. In the following sections we discuss the func-
tionalities of our prototype. We also discuss how they address each of the three
main physical access control administration problems identied earlier.
Fig. 4. Browser based user interface for access control administration with 3D visual-
isation window
4.1 Create Access Control Rules from BIM Visualisation
The conguration mode of the prototype can be used in creating access control
policies that would be used in the authorisation framework. Administrators can
visually select a target resource from BIM that the users need to be given access.
This three-dimensional interface can be more intuitive for administrators as the
required prior knowledge is minimised. For example, an administrator can select
a particular space from the BIM visualisation and assign it to users or roles. The
conguration mode of the prototype utilises the following functionalities of the
tool:
Manage Users: Users can be assigned to one or more roles. Both users and roles
can have resource assignments and conditions.
Manage Resources: Rooms and hallways in a building are mapped as individ-
ual spaces. These spaces can be grouped into the logical relationship of zones.
Each of the individual spaces can have multiple accessible door objects. Access
assignments can happen at all three of these object levels.
Identify Paths: An important spatial functionality of this tool is the ability to
determine all potential paths to a destination. It maps physical spaces from
the BIM into a graph with doors as weighted nodes connecting them based on
the security criteria. The administrator can specify the conditions that must
be satised. Some of these conditions include, shortest path, the path that goes
through CCTV camera monitoring, the paths that are currently least crowded, or
those that require the minimum security clearances. These additional conditions
are also attached to the graph links. The path nding functionality uses graph
traversal to identify optimal paths for a given criteria.
Dene Conditions: This tool supports the denition of dierent types of con-
ditions that can govern the access policies. Logical inclusions and exclusions of
resources from assignments are allowed with dierent Boolean operators. For
example, a particular space can be excluded from an assignment when a corre-
sponding user or role has access to another specic space. This can be a powerful
feature in applying separation of duty constraints. Each of these conditions can
be time limited based on xed times or relative times.
Assign Access Rules: Those access conditions with corresponding resources can
be assigned for users or roles as access permissions. This permission-assignment
relationship provides the connectivity between the user model and the policy
model in the meta-model shown in Figure 3.
Alert on Inconsistencies: The tool has the feature of checking across existing
policy rules when creating a new rule. This alerts the administrators of any
potential inconsistencies across existing rules and new rules. For example, when
a new resource assignment violates an exclusion condition this can alert the
administrator to change policy rules or to remove the assignment.
Propagate Access Rights: Once access policy rules are dened they can be prop-
agated to enforcement-level objects. For example, in physical access control sys-
tems, a policy rule for accessing a space can be transformed into multiple door
access rules that can be uploaded to door lock controllers.
Figure 5 shows how administrators can use the tool to automatically calcu-
late all the spaces that they need to give access in order to reach a given space
from a starting point. They can additionally rene these with actions and con-
ditions associated with the resource. There can also be other separation of duty
and least privilege constraints applied to these conditions. The tool would then
generate the access control policy rules comprising the Subject, Object, Action
and Condition elements that can be mapped into an XACML policy. These rules
can again be transformed into low-level enforcement policies for a PACS that
controls individual doors based on the GUID properties of the doors computed
through space containment relationships. We note that some rules with complex
conditions may not be supported depending on the capabilities of the PACS.
The same policy can be transformed into the proprietary formats supported by
dierent PACSs from dierent vendors. The reverse of the same transformations
can be used to manage policies from dierent systems in a single tool.
Fig. 5. Path calculated from external starting point to the selected space
Let us see how this can be applied in the example scenario presented earlier.
The end point can be selected as the room shown in yellow on Figure 5 where
the maintenance task needs to be carried out. The starting point could be any
of the external gates through which the technician can enter the airport. There
can be multiple paths to this particular room passing through dierent spaces.
In the current access control systems, this access knowledge will depend on the
expertise of the security administrator. Using this tool, the administrator can
calculate dierent path options with dierent criteria such as lowest security
clearance or shortest distance, and the system can identify the best path option.
This path option can then be translated into a list of spaces or portals that
need to be given access. The tool can also automatically alert the administrator
if the only available path requires a higher clearance level than a maintenance
technician can have, for which alternative arrangements, such as an escort, can
be made.
4.2 Visualise and Analyse Access Control Rules using BIMs
One of the prominent problems in current access control administration tools
is the diculty in reporting the current access privileges for a user or a role.
Even though they provide textual lists of user/role privileges, these lists can be
long, making it dicult for administrators to relate the privileges to the spaces
they make accessible within a large facility. To address this requirement, the
prototype enables administrators to visualise, as accessible spaces, the privileges
possessed by a user or role (Figure 6).
Search Access Control Policy: Administrators can perform various search queries
on a policy and rene the search results by users, roles, conditions, etc. The
rened policy rules can also be edited within the tool.
Fig. 6. Managing physical access through visualisation: (a) List users that can access
the selected space, (b) Show spaces the selected user can access.
Visualise Access Control Policy: Selected policy set can be visually overlayed
on BIM visualisation. For example, all policy sets corresponding to a role can
be visually overlayed to show users/roles that have access to a selected space
(shown in yellow on Figure 6a) or to show the spaces and zones the role can
access (shown in yellow on Figure 6b). This also allows one to edit the specic
policy sets from the visualisation.
Analyse Access Control Policy: The tool can analyse the loaded access policy
against existing conditions to nd inconsistencies and violations. This can be use-
ful when auditing sets of existing rules from an external physical access control
system that are loaded into the authorisation faramework. For example, admin-
istrators can view all the spaces that are accessible by a user at normal times or
under emergency conditions. These spaces can be highlighted on a visualisation
of the building.
Security administrators can load existing access control policies for particular
users or roles and visualise the spaces they can access. This search functionality
can be further narrowed down with additional conditions and timeframes, which
can be used for scenario planning and analysis. The use of BIMs to represent the
relationships between objects presents another interesting functionality where
analysis can be performed on given access rights and inconsistencies can be
identied at a policy level.
4.3 Access Control Audit and Analysis using BIMs
The audit mode of this tool can be used on physical access control logs in con-
junction with BIMs. In this mode of operation administrators can visualise past
access logs superimposed as access paths (Figure 5) or aggregated spaces (Fig-
ure 6b) on a BIM visualisation.The following functionalities of the prototype
implementation are utilised in this mode of operation.
Access Log: The access log is a simple implementation of past access records.
The log entries are assumed to be imported from an external physical access
control system. The minimal entities for each access log are a timestamp, a user
ID and a resource ID. The resource ID corresponds to the GUID of a door in
the meta-model.
Generate Access Path: This tool can generate access paths for each user based
on the log entries by connecting the relevant doors. This connected path can
be visually overlaid on a BIM along with the policy rules for the corresponding
user.
Analyse Access Log: The analysis functionality takes access log entries and com-
pares it with existing policy rules. This can be useful in identifying any short-
coming in the enforcement arrangement such as tailgating or reversed doors.
These functionalities are used to implement the access control audit require-
ments. The access logs can be searched to narrow down accesses by a particular
user or to a given space within a given timeframe. BIMs can be used as both
visualisation front ends and to provide the base for spatial analysis for access
audits. In case of physical access logs, they can be used to generate the access
path for a given user within a given time, using the list of doors accessed. This
can be visually overlayed on a BIM visualisation as a tentative path connect-
ing these doors. This capability can be used by administrators as a post event
analysis tool and can be extended to provide monitoring for path deviations
and access errors. For example, we can show access errors for a selected user and
which doors they have tried to access for which they do not hold access privilege.
The user logs can also be aggregated and visualised as set of spaces and zones
instead of individual paths. For example, administrators can select a user or a
role and visually compare the spaces they can access from the policy and the
spaces they have used in the past from the logs. This can be useful in identifying
redundant access privileges that accumulate over time. The same access audits
can also be used in other operational analysis such as time spent by a user in
a given space. For example, assuming egress is also controlled, it is possible to
extract the length of time a maintenance technician spends in a given space and
compare it with their job assignments.
5 Future Work
Our current work opens up multiple avenues for future research. This paper was
based on an assumption that it is easier for security administrators to work with
3D representation of facilities, than to use the existing two-dimensional oor
plans. However, the validity of this assumption as well as the usability of the
proposed tool are yet to be evaluated. We would also like to investigate how
to extend the proposed tool such that it supports converged access control, to
enable the control of access to information systems as well as physical resources.
Finally, we would like to investigate how to interface the proposed tool with open
standard communication protocols for building automation and control networks
such as BACNet [1].
6 Conclusion
Physical access control administration in large-scale facilities is a dicult task.
Administrators should be able to easily comprehend the complex nature of their
environments in order to make informed access control policy decisions. However
currently available physical access control administration tools do not consider
usability as a key requirement. We proposed a physical access control mechanism
that facilitates visual access control administration using building information
models. We based our access control framework on the basic concepts of role-
based access control and other well-dened security constructs to ensure a solid
formal grounding for the concepts presented in this paper. The main advantage of
the proposed approach is that it can reduce dependency on expert knowledge and
provide decision-making capabilities in performing security administrative tasks.
This is primarily achieved through providing a 3D visualisation of a facility,
path nding functionality and identication of potential inconsistencies within
a policy rule set.
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